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Damage Remedies For Tender Offerors-
The Extent of Appropriate Compensation
INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the First and Second
Circuits ' have dealt with whether a defeated tender offeror, whose take-
over attempt has been thwarted by the fraudulent defensive actions of
target management, should be allowed to recover damages from the
target corporation itself. Both courts decided to permit an offeror an
implied cause of action under section 14(e) , the antifraud provision
of the recently enacted Williams Act.' While both courts elected to per-
mit recovery," a crucial disagreement with respect to the nature of con-
'H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd 482
F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973), Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1973).
215 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or m favor of any such
offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this sub-
section, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or mampulative.leL
I The Williams amendments also imposed disclosure requirements on offerors, § 14(d) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1970), and regulation of the targets' defensive actions, § 14(d) (4),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (4), § 13(e) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1970).
4 In addition to relying upon the rationale of J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, see text ac-
companying notes 5-8 snfra, both Porter and Chris-Craft found justification for their deci-
sion to allow damages in the context in which section 14(e) was enacted. Porter, 482 F.2d
at 424, Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 358-61.
Rule 10b-S already covered tender offer transactions, but rights of action under it had
been restricted, under the Birnbaum doctrine, to "purchasers and sellers." See note 27 mifra.
Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, neither a tender offeror nor a target corporation
had been allowed to sue under Rule 10b-5. Iroquois Indus. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969). In Iroquois Industries, a case with facts strikingly similar to those
m Porter, the Second Circuit denied a right of action to the tender offeror in a rule 10b-5
action. That court saw the then new, but not yet applicable, section 14(e) as evidence of con-
gressional belief that this particular "gap" in rule 10b-5 coverage existed, thereby strongly
=mplying that section 14(e) was intended to close this "gap."
The second prong of the (Williams) amendment is § 14(e). In effect this ap-
plies rule lob-5 both to the offeror and to the opposition-very likely, except per-
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gressional purpose in this area led to different attitudes towards the
extent of such recovery.
The focus upon congressional purpose stems from the very nature
of implied causes of action under the federal securities laws and the
rationale of 1.1. Case Co. v. Borak! That decision announced a
duty of the federal courts "to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."6 The Supreme
Court took notice of the limitations on SEC resources, and of the fact
that "the possibility of civil damages serves as a most effective weapon
in the enforcement of the securities laws,"7 concluding therefore that
private actions are a "necessary supplement to [the Securities and Ex-
change] Commission action."'
The First Circuit, in H.K. Porter v. Nicholson File Co.," in-
timated that the relevant congressional purpose was an overriding con-
cern for target corporation investors, and therefore held "that damages
should be denied to . . . the extent they are inconsistent with [the in-
haps for any bearing it may have on the issue of standing, only a codification of
existing law.
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Control Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1969).
The Porter court also pointed out the important economic stake each contestant has
in the takeover bid and their "'symmetrical' statutory obligations," concluding that recip-
rocal rights of action are "only fair." 482 F.2d at 424. The court was probably influenced
by the fact that section 14(e) prohibits misrepresentations in "opposition to or in favor of
any such tender offer." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970) (emphasis added). Moreover, SEC regu-
lations promulgated under the filing and disclosure provisions of the Williams Act impose
restrictions and obligations on target management as well as on the offeror. Schedule 13D,
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974) (eff. July 30, 1968), promulgated under the authority given
to the SEC by § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)(1) (1970), requires that a disclosure state-
ment be filed by anyone acquiring more than 5 percent of certain equity securities other
than pursuant to a tender offer, or by anyone making a tender offer which could result in
the offeror holding more than 5 percent of certain equity securities.
The statement must disclose the offeror's name, address, occupation, employment his-
tory, and any criminal record for the last ten years. The source and amount of funds to
be used, the plans the offeror may have for the target if his offer is successful, his present
interest in the target's securities, and any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to the securities of the target must all be disclosed.
The implied cause of action for damages has also been grounded on the common law
tort principle of allowing private suits to enforce public legislation by plaintiffs who are
within the class of persons intended to be benefited by the statute. Porter, 482 F.2d at 424;
Chris-Craft, 408 F.2d at 360. See RESTATEMENT op TORTS § 286 (1965). And, finally, the
strong similarity between the language of section 10(b) and that of section 14(e), coupled
with the omission of "purchase and sale" language in the latter, has been relied upon.
Porter, 482 F.2d at 421; Chris-Craft, 480 F.2d at 361; Electronic Specialty Co., 409 F.2d
at 941.
S 3 7 7 U.S. 426 (1964).
6 Id. at 433.
7 The proposition that imposition of civil damages will deter securities law violations,
and that recovery of such damages will encourage vigorous private prosecution of such
violations, is referred to in this note as the "incentive-deterrence theory."
8 377 U.S. at 432.
9353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972), aff'd 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 51:171
REMEDIES FOR TENDER OFFERORS
vestor protection] purpose."" ° On the other hand, the Second Circuit
in Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corp." recognized a broader
congressional purpose of insuring the integrity and efficiency of the
securities markets, and demonstrated its intention to allow recovery of
all provable damages.' 2
This note will suggest that the Second Circuit's decision to allow
recovery of all provable damages is the better view. In essence this note
contends that the Chris-Craft interpretation of congressional purpose is
more persuasive, and that the limitations on recovery which Porter
seems to impose would undercut an investor protection policy.
H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co.
In the recent case of H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., the
First Circuit raised, but did not resolve, the problem of compensating a
tender offeror whose takeover attempt had been thwarted by fraudulent
defensive actions by the target's management. The court faced the di-
lemma after a 1972 attempt by the H. K. Porter Company to gain con-
trol of the Nicholson File Company by means of a tender offer. Nichol-
son's management resisted the takeover attempt with a series of letters
to stockholders, press releases, and lawsuits.'3 The tender offer expired
with Porter purchasing less than one-third the number of shares it
sought. Porter brought suit against Nicholson and the Nicholson direc-
tors claiming that Nicholson's defensive activities and statements were
fraudulent.'"
In support of its motion to dismiss, Nicholson argued that it would
be an "anomaly" to assess a damage judgment against it since the bur-
den would eventually fall on Nicholson's shareholders.'" The district
court answered by recognizing the existence of another class of protected
shareholders: "the shareholders of the tendering [offering] corpora-
tion who must ultimately bear the damages suffered by the offeror."' 6
On appeal, the First Circuit agreed that an implied cause of action for
damages should be permitted under section 14(e). Yet when con-
fronted with the issue of determining damages, the appellate court could
only state:
10 482 F.2d at 424.
1 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973).
1
2 Id. at 379-80.
'341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972) (motion for preliminary injunction denied, allega-
tions of violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 dismissed).
14 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1972).
15 Id. at 165.
161d.
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It follows, however from the overriding investor-protection purpose
of § 14(e) that damages should be denied to a tender offeror to the
extent they are inconsistent with that [investor-protection] purpose.
... We cannot yet know the theory of damages to be established,
-nor how and to what extent recovery from Nicholson might affect the
various Nicholson shareholders (of whom Porter has been one), nor
what right of recovery may be available to the other Nicholson stock-
holders to offset the effect of any corporate loss. . . . Any recovery
in damages from the corporation must be consistent with the primary
congressional aim of protecting investors, and the district court would
be warranted in denying damages, otherwise established, if it should
conclude that to award them would be to subvert that purpose.17
Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corporation
The Second Circuit was confronted by the same basic question in
Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corp. Yet there is no indica-
tion that that court saw any conflict between a congressional purpose
of protecting investors and a policy of compensating tender offerors
who have been defeated by means of section 14(e) violations. The court
awarded substantial damages to a defrauded offeror but made no men-
tion of the effect of such recovery upon the defendant's shareholders.
This case arose from an extended battle for the control of Piper
Aircraft Corporation. Chris-Craft Industries attempted to gain control
of Piper by means of open market purchases commencing on December
20, 1968, as well as a cash tender offer which occurred shortly there-
after. Piper's management resisted this takeover bid by various means,'"
eventually encouraging the Bangor Punta corporation to launch a rival
takeover bid, and agreeing to aid that attempt by selling their 31 per-
cent interest in Piper for a package of Bangor Punta securities."' As a
result of these acquisitions, open market purchases, and an exchange
tender offer, Bangor Punta obtained control (51 percent) of Piper. At
the end of the contest, Piper found itself in possession of approximately
17 482 F.2d at 424-25.
The court, despite its concern for the shareholders of the target corporation, allowed
the district court ruling that Porter, once it proved liability, could recover damages from
the target, to stand. "We do not disturb that ruling now." Id. at 425. The Porter deci-
sion was cited in Chris-Craft as authority that an offeror has standing to sue a target cor-
poration for damages resulting from its section 14(e) violations, 480 F.2d at 358, 360.
18 These included a board resolution that the Chris-Craft offer was not in the best
interests of Piper shareholders (mailed to shareholders), letters to shareholders, and a press
release announcing a putative agreement on the part of Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corporation to purchase 300,000 shares of Piper, and abortive attempts to increase the
number of outstanding Piper shares. 480 F.2d at 349-54.
19 480 F.2d at 352-53.
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42 percent of outstanding Piper shares, and sued Bangor Punta,
20 for
section 14(e) violations."
At first glance, Chris-Craft and Porter might seem to address two
different issues, since Chris-Craft allowed the defeated tender offeror
damages against a rival, successful, tender offeror, rather than against
a target corporation. The target corporation in Chris-Craft was found
to be "the prize in the battle, not a contender"22 and no liability was
imposed upon it. However, because that successful tender offeror
achieved its takeover by means of an exchange offer, after the contest
many investors who originally were shareholders of the target corpora-
tion found themselves shareholders of the successful offeror, which was
held liable for substantial damages.2"
The fact that Chris-Craft dealt with the same basic problem which
had perplexed the Porter court was recognized in the original district
court opinion dismissing Christ-Craft's complaint against all defen-
dants.2" The district court realized that plaintiff's recovery against the
rival offeror in Chris-Craft was really no different, in terms of impact
on target shareholders, than recovery against the target corporation
itself, i.e., the Porter situation. Because the defendant in Chris-Craft,
Bangor Punta, won control by means of an exchange tender offer,
"[t]he proximate victims of virtually all the alleged violations . . . are
one-time Piper stockholders who now hold Bangor Punta stock. These
are the very people against whom Chris-Craft wishes us (by a judg-
ment against their company) to assess many millions of dollars of
damage .... 22
As the district court opinion recognized, to whatever extent one
might consider the award of damages to a defeated offeror "anoma-
lous,"' 26 the "anomaly" is the same whether damages are awarded in
the Chris-Craft situation or in the Porter situation. It would make no
sense to protect target shareholders when they have been tricked into
refusing a tender offer and retaining their shares in a section 14(e)
corporate defendant, and yet to refuse such protection when they have
20 Other defendants included members of the target's management (referred to as the
Piper family), members of the successful offeror's management, and First Boston Corpora-
tion, the underwriter of the successful offer, with members of its management.
21 480 F.2d at 354.
22 480 F.2d at 379 n.34.
2 3 Damages awarded the plaintiff by the trial court were $1,673,988. Chris-Craft Indus.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). On appeal, damages were
measured anew at $25,793,365. 516 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1975).
24 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
25 Id.
26,,. .. [Neither reason nor justice would permit such a result." Id.
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been tricked into exchanging their shares with those of a section 14(e)
defendant. The converse would be just as illogical. Given its conviction
that section 14(e) was intended to promote the general integrity and
efficiency of the securities markets it is likely that the Chris-Craft court
will be as willing to assess compensatory damages against a target cor-
poration when a case such as Porter comes before it.
Effectiveness of Permitting Recovery from the Target
In both Porter and Chris-Craft, the judicial decision to allow an
implied cause of action for a defeated offeror against a target corpora-
tion depended upon an analogy to implied causes of action under rule
10b-5, ' and therefore upon the mandate in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak that
"it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are
necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."2 Whatever res-
ervations it had with respect to the extent of recovery, even the Porter
court thought that allowing the offeror to act as a private attorney
general could serve as a useful supplement to the limited enforcement
resources of the SEC. The effectiveness of private enforcement is there-
fore crucial to the basic rationale for allowing recovery from the target
corporation. More specifically, it must be determined whether the right
to recover damages29 from the target is an effective and necessary addi-
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). Rule lOb-5 is the broad antifraud provision of the
federal securities regulations. It was promulgated by the SEC under the authority granted
by section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The scope of rule 10b-5
has been expanded by imposing liability for "mere negligence." See generally Chris-Craft
Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910
(1973); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir. 1971); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969);
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 811 (1965).
Standards of causation have also been relaxed. See generally Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970);
Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973).
It is generally true that a plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities in order
to be granted an implied cause of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, a theory com-
monly known as the Birnbaum doctrine. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, -
U.S. -, 95 S.Ct 1917 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.
1952).
For policy reasons, courts have used the Birnbaum doctrine to retain some limits on
rule lob-S actions. "That the conduct averred in any given case may be reprehensible does
not mean that a federal remedy must be furnished by judges." Iroquois Indus. v. Syracuse
China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 969 (2d Cir. 1969) (rule 10b-5); see also Greenstein v. Paul,
400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968); Washburn v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 340 F. Supp.
504 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
28 377 U.S. at 426 (1964).
29 Injunctive relief alone is clearly inadequate because a target may defend against an
offer by means of secret market manipulation, or by statements which will not be known
to have been deceptive until the contest is over, and because of the vital importance of
speed in a tender offer takeover attempt.
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tion to the undisputed right to sue the target's officers and directors as
individual defendants.3 0
First of all, the shareholders of the target corporation might argue
that there would be no additional deterrent effect to be gained by assess-
ing damages against the corporation.' If the target's directors and
executives cannot be deterred by the threat of a damage action brought
against themselves, it is perhaps unlikely that they will be deterred by
the threat of a law suit against the corporation. Imposing such a burden
on innocent shareholders would be more difficult to justify if a court
was convinced that officers and directors do not care, or care little, about
a damage judgment that in fact will be satisfied by the shareholders.
But surely this is too cynical. It does not seem likely that the aver-
age executive is so lost to decency that he cares nothing about the enter-
prise entrusted to his care. In any event, an executive's career depends
upon the fate of the corporation and upon his competence in running
its affairs,3" including keeping it out of lawsuits. Moreover, executives
commonly own stock or stock options in their respective corporations.
Thus on balance the prospect of a suit against the corporation itself
should have a deterrent effect.
Because of the important personal stake the incumbent management
of the target has in the contest, defensive tactics which involve section
14(e) violations probably do not appear as morally reprehensible as in
the typical fraud case and can usually be rationalized as being "in the
corporate interest." Indeed, because of the magnitude of the stakes in
the tender offer situation, the temptation to violate the antifraud provi-
sions is greater than in the ordinary purchase or sale of securities, thus
making the strict enforcement of those provisions even more necessary
than usual. 3
The possibility that officers and directors ordered to pay damages
for section 14(e) violations may be compensated through either indem-
nification or insurance3 provides an additional reason for permitting
"o"Recovery from the individual defendants is, of course, on a different footing. The
individual defendants have not yet advanced any good reason why they should not be
accountable in damages for illegal action, if any." Porter, 482 F.2d at 425.
3' In both Porter and Chris-Craft, officers and directors were joined as defendants.
2 An exception might be the outside director who owns little or no target stock.
31 Note, 19 VnL. L. REv. 671, 680 (1974).
.4 See generally G. WA s~orGToN & J. BisHoP, INDEmxuYING 2B CORPORATE ExEcu-
nvn (1963); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALr L.J. 1078 (1968); Note, Indemnification of
Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust Legislation, 76 ftARv.
L. REv. 1403 (1963); Note, Indemnifying Corporate Officials for Williams Act Violations,
SO Iko. L.. 826 (1975).
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recovery from the target. If an officer or director will be indemnified,
any distinction between suing the individual and suing the corporation
disappears. Moreover, the basic rationale for permitting any recovery
is the hope of deterring violations on the part of target executives in
future tender offers. If such individuals know that insurance or in-
demnification will cover any damage judgments against themselves, the
only deterrent effect to be hoped for lies in the threat of additional re-
covery against their corporations. While executives and directors prob-
ably are concerned about the welfare of their firm, to some extent
the effectiveness of deterrence depends on the likelihood that target
shareholders will impose sanctions on officers and directors who cause
their corporation to pay heavy civil damages. For this reason, in every
situation where damages will ultimately be paid by the corporation, a
court should make clear to the shareholders just what is happening and
who is paying.
Finally, an argument that there is nothing to be gained by permit-
ting recovery of damages against the target also disregards the incen-
tive side of the incentive-deterrence theory. In shaping damage reme-
dies, courts should also keep in mind the importance of providing the
necessary incentive for vigorous private prosecution of section 14(e)
violations. Unless it will be worth the trouble to sue for damages (keep-
ing in mind the heavy litigation expenses involved), the offeror will
find little incentive to seek anything other than pre-injury injunctive
relief. Corporate executives are well paid, but not many could pay the
kind of damages likely to be involved in a suit of this kind. 5
On balance it would appear that a cause of action for damages by
the defeated tender offeror against the target corporation can be an effec-
tive tool for enforcement of federal securities legislation, both as a de-
terrent to section 14(e) violations and as an incentive for private prose-
cution of such violations. However, as will later become apparent, the
effectiveness of employing offerors as private attorneys general will de-
pend on the extent and predictability of the damage recovery.
PORTER AND "INVESTOR PROTECTION"
Because of its primary concern for the protection of target inves-
tors36 the First Circuit announced in Porter that a court "would be war-
'
3 The plaintiff in Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. was awarded $25,793,365.00,
and that in a case where it was held that the plaintiff-offeror had lost, not "control," but
only its "opportunity to gain control." Chris-Craft failed to establish that it could have
succeeded in obtaining enough shares to give it control. 480 F.2d at 373, 378-79.
36 A subsidiary problem with the Porter court's concern for investor protection is that
it embraces only target shareholders. It is inconsistent to perceive the target corporation
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ranted in denying damages, otherwise established, if it should conclude
that to award them would be to subvert [the investor protection] pur-
pose" of the statute, and that "damages should be denied to the extent
they are inconsistent with that purpose." ' The court's directive to the
district court invites speculation as to what theory of damages could
qualify.38 This approach also raises the question of the probable effect
of such a computation of damages on the original incentive-deterrence
rationale of private damage suits, and of whether a policy of fully com-
pensating plaintiff-offerors would really be inimical to the interests of
target shareholders.
Computation of Damages
The Porter court did not explain the measure of damages which
the district court was to apply. However, two possible tests suggest
themselves. The Porter court's directive would apparently allow the
offeror some recovery from the target, but the amount of the damages
either (1) must not be excessive, or (2) must meet, but not exceed, a
threshold of sufficiency. Neither approach wouldbe practical.
The "not excessive" test suggests that the meaning of Porter is
that the calculation of damages should minimize harm to the defendant
corporation and its shareholders by simply keeping the recovery of dam-
ages per share, or per shareholder, below some unacceptable level. The
duty of the district court would therefore be to derive this level of ac-
ceptability for its damage judgment from some sort of calculus involv-
ing the number of shareholders, the size and financial health of the
as a group of individual, innocent shareholders, while seeing the defeated offeror only as
"another of the rival management or control groups jockeying for power." 482 F.2d at 424.
A tender offer is a very expensive undertaking; if it is unsuccessful because of a target's
section 14(e) violations, a considerable loss will result. If the offeror is not compensated for
this loss, the burden must necessarily be borne by its innocent shareholders.
There is authority that the offeror's shareholders are a "protected class" and there-
fore have standing to sue under section 14(e). In Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co.,
336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971) (suit against the offeror), the court wrote: "[T]he
purpose of Congress in enacting section 14(e) was to protect the investing public from
harm caused by misleading tender offers. Shareholders of the offeror are plainly within
the class for whom such protection was designed." Id. at 914.
17482 F.2d at 425. The court also stated that "[wie cannot yet know ... what right
of recovery may be available to the other Nicholson [target] stockholders to offset the
effect of any corporate loss." Id. Forcing a target to compensate its shareholders for the
diminution in the value of their shares which will result from such a judgment would
be desirable, but only feasible where the number of these "innocent" shareholders is
relatively small.
a8 At the outset it should be noted that framing the issue in terms of determining
"the probable impact of recovery from Nicholson [the target] on its shareholders" begs
the question. 482 F.2d at 425. If a 14(e) violation by the target has caused damage to
the offeror corporation and thus to its shareholders, then one group of shareholders will
have to bear the loss. The issue should be which group of shareholders will bear what
proportion of the loss which has already occurred.
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target, and the actual losses of the offeror. Under this analysis the larger
and more prosperous the target corporation, the larger the number of
its shareholders, the greater would be the acceptable damages.
Aside from the rather speculative nature of any such inquiry, and
the fact that it would seem remarkable to calculate damages in a civil
action on the basis of what is essentially an "ability to pay" system,
there is no reason to believe that such a system would produce results
that promote the policies underlying civil suits in the first place. The
result would correspond neither to the damages suffered by the defeated
offeror nor, and perhaps more importantly, to the litigation expenses
involved in a suit of this kind. The original idea was to encourage
vigorous enforcement of the securities regulations by private parties,
but under this test, the only such litigation would be against those cor-
porate defendants large and financially healthy -enough to "qualify."
The weaker the financial condition of a corporation, the less its man-
agement would have to fear when contemplating section 14(e) viola-
tions during a takeover battle-though the shaky condition of the target
may have been the result of their mismanagement.
Besides the "not excessive" test for damages discussed above, an-
other possibility is "threshold sufficiency." Porter could mean that the
district court is to arrive at that amount of damages which is just large
enough to encourage vigorous litigation by defrauded tender offerors
but no more. If the only concern is the incentive-deterrence goal this
theory may be an ideal compromise under the rationale of the Porter
court. However, the difficulty of arriving at such a figure in an indi-
vidual case is clear; the problem of establishing a predictable formula
for figuring a "threshold of sufficiency" which will provoke vigorous
prosecution of future violations is even more imposing.
The Porter court said that they could not "yet know the theory of
damages to be established."39 However, under the two possible ap-
proaches to Porter discussed above, damages would be so speculative
and unpredictable as to jeopardize the original incentive-deterrence pol-
icy. Damages should be either granted or denied on the basis of clear
and predictable criteria.
The Relationship Between the Interests of Target Shareholders
And a Policy of Allowing Recovery of all Provable Damages
The Porter court declined to specify a theory of damages because
of its concern for the impact on target shareholders. What this approach
39482 F.2d at 425.
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seems to ignore is the fact that target shareholders have as much to fear
from section 14(e) violations on the part of their incumbent officers
and directors as from an offeror's violations.
Where a target's management has successfully defeated a takeover
bid by means of a section 14(e) violation, the target's remaining share-
holders can be divided into two classes :40 first, those who either unsuc-
cessfully tendered or, but for the section 14(e) violations, would have
tendered and, second, those who would have chosen to keep their shares
regardless of whether they had known the truth. In this situation, at
least the first group and quite possibly the second, has been injured by
the target management's4 ' misrepresentations.
Members of the first group, those who either unsuccessfully ten-
dered their shares or, but for the target's misrepresentation, would have
tendered, have lost, at a minimum, the premium over current market
price which that offer almost certainly included.42 This group also suf-
fers the detriment of being "locked" into their holdings in the target.
Regardless of the outcome of the tender offer, the market price of the
target's share tends to stay depressed for a fairly long period of time.43
Consequently, these shareholders are left with the unenviable choice of
either selling out at a loss consisting of both the decline in market value
and the premium they would have received, or of keeping their shares
in a corporation whose management is negligent and quite possibly in-
competent or dishonest. Moreover, these shareholders may very well
have been disenchanted even before the takover contest, since indifferent
earnings and dividends performance, and a history of poor shareholder
4 0 These two classes are not entirely distinct. Most tender offers are conditioned on
the tender of a specified number of shares. If the number of tendered shares does not equal
the number required, the offeror has often reserved the right to purchase all, a part, or
none of the shares actually tendered. Some shareholders may tender only a part of their
holdings. Others may tender their entire holdings. Because of the pro-rata takeup require-
ments of the Williams Act, if more shares are tendered than accepted, every tendering
shareholder will still own stock in the target. 15 U.S.C. §78n(d)(6) (1970). If the
section 14(e) violations have been so effective that at the time of expiration of the offer,
the offeror feels he has little chance of success, he may opt to return all the tendered
shares.
In any event, shareholders who sought to tender, or would have tendered, retain
their status as shareholders of the target corporation. Their only safe approach is to deal
with arbitrageurs, eliminating the risk but diminishing their gain.
41 This discussion does not deal with the motivations and interests of shareholders
who were directors and officers guilty of the misconduct in question. Ironically, these in-
dividuals may have sold their stock in the target to the offeror while discouraging their
fellow stockholders from doing the same.42 Premiums have been found to represent a bonus over the current market price of
as much as 44 percent with a median of 16 percent over market-a considerable loss,
especially if a shareholder has sizable holdings. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover
Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. RFv. 135, 139-40 (Mar.-Apr. 1967).
43 Id. at 147.
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relations, are factors for which potential tender offerors look when eval-
uating possible targets.4
The interests of the second class of shareholders, those who would
have chosen to hold their shares regardless of what management did or
did not say, may very well have been harmed as well. Of course, it is
possible that some members of this class simply preferred the incumbent
management to the offeror, that they were not influenced by the truth
or falsity of statements made during the takeover fight, and are quite
satisfied with the failure of the takeover bid. Some members of this
class, however, could have decided to retain some or all of their shares
because they were dissatisfied with incumbent management, yet desired
to keep their interest in the enterprise itself (in which they still had
faith) in the hope that the tender offer would succeed and in the belief
that the offeror could better manage the target corporation. These
shareholders, as a result of section 14(e) violations, are also "locked"
into their holdings.
It is certainly true that the Williams Act was intended to benefit
target shareholders. 6 When adhered to by both sides of a takeover
battle, it will provide the target shareholders with time, information and
freedom from misrepresentation. The Act will thereby better enable the
44 The simple fact that an attacking group exists is not in itself an adequate
reason for a tender offer; a basic dissatisfaction among the shareholders with
the company's performance-due to the short comings of the present management
or the events beyond its control-must be present before an opposition force can
hope to conduct a successful tender offer.
D. Austin & J. FismAN, CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT 3 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
AusriN & FimS.AN].
45 Swanson, S. 510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George
from the Dragon, 5 HARv. J. LEGIS. 431, 472 (1968).
46 See generally Note, Tender Offers: An Analysis of the Early Development of Standing
to Sue Under Section 14(e), 5 TEXAs TEcHr. L. REv. 779 (1974); Note, Tender Offers:
The Liberalization of Standing Requirements Under Section 14(e), 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 561
(1972).
Though the perceived need for protection of incumbent management was probably
the reason for the introduction of the Williams Act, it seems clear that Congress came to
see the tender offer as a socially useful and legitimate business device. Even in his speech
introducing the bill, Senator Williams recognized that an abrupt change of management
may at times be a good thing for a corporation. 113 CoNo. REc. 854 (1967). The most
important substantive change in the bill was the elimination of a requirement of advance
notice to the target itself. This change preserved for future offerors the element of sur-
prise, which has been described as the one essential requirement for a successful tender offer.
AUSTI N & FISHMAN at 35-36. The courts have generally accepted "investor protection" as
the purpose behind the Williams Act. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 597 (5th Cir. 1974); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson Fire Co., 482 F.2d 421, 424 (1st
Cir. 1973); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947
(2nd Cir. 1969); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597, 601
(D.N.J. 1974). Though they have disagreed as to what that term means, courts have
pretty clearly rejected the notion that the statute was meant to protect incumbent
management.
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target shareholder to deal rationally with the decision confronting him
in a tender offer. It is by performing this function that the Act protects
target investors. Because this policy is jeopardized by every violation
of section 14(e), whether by a target or an offeror, civil damages should
be allowed against either. The interests of target shareholders in gen-
eral will be furthered by vigorous enforcement of section 14(e), yet by
refusing to delineate a clear and predictable theory of damages, Porter
undercut both the deterrent and the incentive effect of the dimage
remedy.
CHRIS-CRAFT AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS
The Porter court's concern with the impact of damage liability on
the target's shareholders implies that "investor protection" was the only
value meant to be furthered by the Williams Act. But besides the -in-
terests of "protected investors," however defined, the Williams Act can
also be viewed as serving more general social and economic policies. It
protects the interest of the investing public, and indeed of the entire
country, in fair and honest dealings within the securities market.
The Second Circuit in Chris-Craft concluded that the interests of
private citizens, even members of a "protected class," must necessarily
be subordinated to the broader congressional purpose of insuring the
integrity and efficiency of the securities markets:
Obviously Congress was concerned about the plight of the average
public investor who is at a serious disadvantage in dealing with persons
possessing superior knowledge, skill and resources. But the public in
the role of investors is only part of the picture. The integrity and
efficiency of the securities markets are even more important since our
entire economy is dependent upon these markets. The securities market
performs the essential function of assessing the value that society places
upon the efforts of a particular enterprise so that society can obtain
the maximum amount of its preferred goods and services that our
resources can produce.... Considering the weightly interests at stake
Congress and the courts justifiably have outlawed all unfair and
deceptive practices related to the trading of securities and have en-
couraged private damage actions to implement the enforcement of the
federal securities laws.4 7
47 480 F.2d at 357. Judge Timbers cites an article which found four ways in which
the value of a corporation's stock effects the amount of available resources which will be
allocated to that enterprise. A corporation will be adversely affected by the under valuation
of its stock because it cannot sell new equity securities at a higher price, because if it
uses market values when selling debt securities its ability to use "leverage" will be dimin-
ished, because any stock-for-stock merger or acquisition will be more costly, and because
it will be at a competitive disadvantage when trying to attract executive personnel with
compensation in the form of stock options. Crossland & James argued that the 1934 Act's
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The implication of the Chris-Craft interpretation48 of congressional
purpose is clear. If this broader congressional purpose of safeguarding
the integrity of the securities markets is recognized, an award of fully
compensatory damages to an offeror defeated by means of section 14(e)
violations is appropriate, even though the burden must fall on the target
shareholder."9 Although apparently no court in the First Circuit has
goal of "fair and honest markets" will cause resources to flow to those companies which
will make the most efficient use of them. Crossland & James, The Gods of the Market
Place: An Examination of the Regulation of the Securities Business, 48 B.U.L. Rev. 515,
518 (1968).
In a concurring opinion in Chris-Craft, Judge Gurfine, although he agreed that private
suits for violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws should be en-
couraged, believed that ". . it is unrealistic and fanciful to suggest that through such
suits society can obtain the maximum amount of goods and services that our resources
can produce." He noted that honesty and efficiency do not always go hand in hand, that
" ..bankruptcies of honest entrepreneurs are all too common." 480 F.2d at 379. Judge
Gurfine perhaps misstates the argument. Even an honest tender offeror may prove an inept
manager, but there is at least something to the argument that fraud and deception can
hurt the proper distribution of resources in the economy. In a case like Porter, the result,
of course, is that the old management stays and, as Senator Williams was at pains to
acknowledge, target management is sometimes inefficient. n some instances a change of
management will be helpful; in the rare case it may even be necessary for corporate
survival. Speech by Senator Williams, 111 CoNGo. REc. 28257, Oct. 22, 1965.
Target corporations tend to have undervalued stock. Low price/earnings ratios have
been found to be their most common characteristic. E. ARP.sow & H. EimHORN, TENDER
OFFEaS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 2-4 (1970). An analysis of target firms from 1956 to
1965 found poor sales and earnings performances and below average, dividends to be major
factors. See AUsTIN & FISHMAN at 57. At least from a shareholder's point of view this is
not producing the "maximum amount qf goods and services." There is, of course, no
guaranty that any individual offeror will do a better job. See AUSTIN & FISHMAN 75-94.
Most firms still in existence after tender offers were in the same relative financial position
since the bid, but of those which did change, more improved performance than worsened
performance. AUSTIN & FISHMAN at 94. A belief that, on average, they will prove at
least marginally better managers can be read into the congressional decision to preserve
the tender offer as a viable tool for transfer of control. There can be no denying the
possibilities of abuse even after the Williams Act. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares
in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297, 336-44 (1974); Brudney, A
Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. Rev. 609, 610-11 (1967). But Congress
was informed of these dangers, and despite the fears of many that the Williams Act would
spell the end of tender offers, or at least make it much more difficult, decided not to
outlaw tender offers, in form or in effect. For pre-Williams Act discussion of what
regulation would do to the tender offer device, see generally Brudney, A Note on Chilling
Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. Rev. 609 (1967); Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 (1965); Manne, Cash Tender Offers for
Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuxE L.J. 231.48
ndeed, Chris-Craft's interpretation of legislative purpose gains added credibility
in light of the legislative history of securities regulation. Section 14(e) is, after all, an
amendment to the Securities Act of 1934, which was motivated not only by the plight of
individual investors but also by the then catastrophic condition of the entire economy.
At that time, Congress believed that fraud and deception in the securities market had an
adverse effect upon public confidence in the economy and therefore upon the economy
itself. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970) ("Necessity for Regulation").
49 It seems clear that punitive damages will not be imposed in suits arising from
implied causes of action under the 1934 Act. See Globus v. Law Res. Serv., Inc., 418
F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968); Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
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yet had to effectuate the Porter decision in an actual award of damages,.
essentially the same problem has been dealt with by the Second Circuit
in Chris-Craft.
The Second Circuit had originally remanded the case to the dis-
trict court on the issue of damages, directing that "[t]he measure of
damages should be the reduction in the appraisal value of CCI's Piper
holdings attributable to BPC's taking a majority position and reducing
CCI to a minority position, and thus being able to compel a merger at
any time."5 The district court attempted to value the "premium" for
Chris-Craft's opportunity to gain control, its "lead position.""s* Find-
ing this "well nigh an impossible task,"52 the court established the fair
market value of the shares by an average of the computations of expert
witnesses, and awarded 5 percent of that amount. 3
On appeal, the Second Circuit substituted its own rather more gen-
erous measure of damages for that originally reached by the district
court. The appropriate measure of damages was held to be the differ-
ence between the price Chris-Craft paid for the target stock and the
price at which it could have sold those shares after its rival, Bangor
Punta, achieved control.5 ' Basing computation of damages on the price
Chris-Craft had paid for its target stock had been previously rejected
by the district court on the grounds that the amounts paid were "wildly
and artificially inflated due to the emotional, as well as actual struggle
of the parties."55 However, the appellate court concluded that
(1970). See also Comment, Remedies for Defrauded Tender Offerors Under Section 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 GEo. L.J. 1963, 1715-17 (1974); Comment,
The Availability of Punitive Damages for Express and Implied Causes of Action Under
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, TEasri. L.Q. 140 (1970).
Contra, de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 302 F. Supp. 647 (D. Colo. 1969); Hect v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968). It is possible that a court would
feel justified in refusing to award damages when a damage remedy would do more than
shift a loss, for example in a suit by an offeror which, despite the "failure" of its offer,
has made a profit on the shares it purchased. But see Dugan & Fairfield, Chris-Craft Corp.
v. Piper Aircraft: Liability in the Context of a Tender Offer, 35 Onxo ST. LJ. 412 (1974).
50480 F.2d at 380.
51 384 F. Supp. 507, 515-23.52 d. at 514.
53 1d. at 515-23.
-4 516 F.2d at 185. judge T'imbers, writing for the appellate court, explained that the
district court had erred, first, by failing to recognize a reduction in the value of Chris-
Crafts Industries' holdings (41 percent of Piper) when Bangor Punta obtained a majority,
and second, by basing its valuation on an anonymous 100 share block of stock, thus failing
to recognize the illiquid nature of Chris-Craft's nearly 700,000 share block. 516 F.2d at 183.
The Second Circuit affirmed that part of the district court's decision which implemented
their earlier directive to include injunctive relief in any judgment. The district court en-
joined Bangor Punta from voting its shares for five years from the date of judgment.
The lower court also ordered rescinded all changes made in the target's bylaws since Bangor
Punta had obtained a majority position. The bylaws, size of the board, and corporate
charter are to remain unchanged unless both Christ-Craft and Bangor Punta mutually
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the prices paid in the battle for control of Piper represented what
astute businessmen, competing in a fair market, thought potentially
controlling blocks of Piper were worth.... [They are] more realistic
and persuasive indicators of value than experts' 'conceptual ap-
praisals' . . 56
The price which a tender offeror was willing to pay for target
shares does represent a convenient and informed opinion as to what
these shares were worth. The offeror will usually be sophisticated,
knowledgeable, and highly motivated to be accurate. He will take care
that his offered price will be neither so stingy that it will fail to attract
enough shares, nor so generous that it will attract a significant surplus
of shares. When an offer attracts more shares than needed, the offeror
knows that he is paying more than necessary for the shares taken up.
This approach should markedly aid the private enforcement of the
Williams Act. The method used is easy to apply and offers defeated
offerors fairly certain and adequate compensation for their losses if
they can prove section 14(e) violations. Predictability of substantial
recovery will supply the needed incentive for tender offerors to under-
take vigorous litigation, and therefore in turn act as a deterrent to
fraudulent and manipulative practices by target management. 7
agree to a change, or unless the court orders a change. Similarly, there may be no change
in the number of the target's outstanding securities, nor any merger, dissolution, or liqui-
dation of Piper without court order. 384 F. Supp. at 523-26.
15 384 F. Supp. at 515 n.8.
56 516 F.2d at 185-86.
5 7 Shares purchased even in an unsuccessful offer may turn out to be a good invest-
ment. A theory of damages based on the price paid for shares might therefore be objected
to on the grounds that this would occasionally permit an offeror to speculate in the
target's stock with the target bearing the risks. Most tender offers are conditioned on
the tender of a specified number of shares. If the number of shares tendered does not
equal the number required, the offeror has often reserved the right to purchase, at his
option, all, a part, or none of the tendered shares. If an offeror voluntarily decides to
take up tendered shares, after his takeover bid has obviously failed, a court should be
reluctant to make the target corporation a virtual insurer of this new investment, even
if it has violated the securities laws. Awarding such damages in this situation would be
unjustified, but the possibility of such speculation cannot justify abandonment of this
theory of damages because the motive of an offeror at the time he takes up shares
would not be incapable of later ascertainment. Doubts should again be resolved against
the wrongdoer. See note 59 infra. It would be a mistake to force offerors who become
aware of target section 14(e) violations to choose between continuing the takeover battle in
good faith at the cost of giving up any chance of suing for damages if the attempt fails
or abandoning the struggle in order to sue immediately. "A victim of a securities fraud
does not have to elect between pursuing his goal in spite of the unlawful tactics of his
opponents and recovery of damages for injuries sustained." Chris-Craft Indus., 480 F.2d
at 376.
If the offeror has not made his offer contingent on the tender of a specified number
of shares, courts should not feel reluctant to award damages based on his price on the
grounds that the offeror could have included such a condition. Such conditions are re-
flected in the price offered. See AusTiN & Fs~rnmrs at 183, 191. If a tender offer fails
because of target fraud, courts should not in effect punish the offeror for failing to in-
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The only area of potential difficulty is the valuation of the offeror's
holdings, but this valuation problem seems no more difficult than many
routinely dealt with by the federal courts. The appellate court in Chris-
Craft made use of a hypothetical public offering at the "earliest realistic
date" after the battle for control was over."0 In any event, potential
plaintiffs need have no fears on this question since the court on principle
resolved doubts and uncertainties against the wrongdoer."
CONCLUSION
Investor protection, one of the purposes behind section 14(e),
should encompass the interests of all shareholders, those of the offeror
as well as those of the target. The offeror should not be denied its
provable damages out of concern for a single class of investors because
a cause of action for damages in favor of an offeror would, in the long
run, promote the interests of all investors. Moreover, it will also fur-
ther the second, broader legislative purpose of maintaining the integrity
of the securities markets.
A damage remedy for tender offerors can be an important tool
for the enforcement of section 14(e). However, its effectiveness will
depend on the extent and predictability of damage recovery. Because
the apparent effect of the Porter decision undercuts the effectiveness of
this enforcement device by denying its "private attorneys general" a
predictably adequate theory of recovery, that decision is no vindication
of legislative intent, but rather a contravention of both statutory pur-
poses enumerated above.
A more fruitful approach is the Second Circuit's decision on lia-
bility and damages in Chris-Craft. The court awarded a tender offeror
who "did not lose in a fair battle,""° a fully compensatory damage re-
covery against a rival tender offeror who "obtained control through its
violations of the securities laws." 6' The next step in furtherance of the
overriding policies of the securities laws is to hold liable for damages
one who has maintained control through violations of the securities laws.
The predictability and adequacy of the theory of damages set forth in
elude such conditions in his offer. An offeror can expect no judicial protection from
normal business risks, but securities law violations are not a risk against which even a
"corporate raider" should be expected to self-insure by paying a higher price.
58516 F.2d at 188-89. The court accepted the estimate of the plaintiff's expert witness.
9 1d. at 189-90, citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Bigelow
v. RKO Radio Pictures Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); and the court's earlier decision in the
case, 480 F.2d at 375.
60 480 F.2d at 373.
6 516 F.2d at 187.
1975]
188 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:171
Chris-Craft will act as both a deterrent to section 14(e) violations, and
as a powerful incentive to the vigorous private prosecution of such
violations.
RANDALL J. NYE
